

Permutation-based symmetric cryptography

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Outline

- 1 Mainstream hash functions
- 2 Block ciphers
- 3 block-cipher based hashing
- 4 The sponge construction
- 5 Applications of the sponge construction
- 6 The duplex construction
- 7 Conclusions

Symmetric crypto: what textbooks and intro's say

Symmetric cryptographic primitives:

- Block ciphers
- Stream ciphers
 - Synchronous
 - Self-synchronizing
- Hash functions
 - Non-keyed
 - Keyed: MAC functions

And their modes-of-use

The swiss army knife of cryptography!

Hash functions:




A closer look at mainstream hash functions

- Attempts at direct design of hash function are rare
- Mainstream hash functions have two layers:
 - Fixed-input-length compression function
 - Iterating mode: *domain extension*

The iterating mode


Basic Merkle-Damgård: very simple and elegant



Yes, but can we have collision-resistance preservation?

The iterating mode


Merkle-Damgård with *strengthening*



Yes, but what about length extension attacks and the like?

The iterating mode


Enveloped Merkle-Damgård



Yes, but we need long output for full-domain hashing (OAEP, RSA-PSS, KEM, etc)?

The iterating mode

Mask generating function construction




This does what we need!

The compression function

- Sound iterating mode reduces:
 - design of F with variable input and output length to
 - design of f with fixed input and output length
- **Sound** means there is some kind of provable security:
 - Property-preservation: F inherits the properties of f
 - Differentiability from a random oracle
 - bound for the effort to distinguish F from a random oracle
 - assuming f randomly chosen and accessible to adversary
 - Provides security assurance against generic attacks
- Gives some hints of criteria for the compression function

The compression function


Let's put in a block cipher



Yes, but collisions are easy so collision-resistance preservation ...


The compression function

Block cipher in Davies-Meyer mode



That's it!

The final solution



Now we just have to build a suitable block cipher ...

What block cipher are used for

- Hashing (as discussed) and its modes HMAC, MGF1, ...
- Block encryption: ECB, CBC, ...
- Stream encryption:
 - synchronous: counter mode, OFB, ...
 - self-synchronizing: CFB
- MAC computation: CBC-MAC, C-MAC, ...
- Authenticated encryption: OCB, GCM, CCM ...

The truth about symmetric crypto today


Block ciphers:




Block-cipher based hashing: time for re-factoring

- Goal: hashing mode that is sound and simple
 - with good level of security against generic attacks
 - calling a block cipher
- Remaining problem: design of a suitable block cipher
 - round function: several good approaches known
 - soundness proofs are typically in *ideal cipher* model
 - key schedule: not clear how to do design good one
- But do we really need a block cipher?

Block cipher operation



Block cipher operation: the inverse




When do you need the inverse?

Indicated in red:


- Hashing and its modes HMAC, MGF1, ...
- Block encryption: ECB, CBC, ...
- Stream encryption:
 - synchronous: counter mode, OFB, ...
 - self-synchronizing: CFB
- MAC computation: CBC-MAC, C-MAC, ...
- Authenticated encryption: OCB, GCM, CCM ...
 - Most schemes with misuse-resistant claims

So for most uses you don't need the inverse!


Block cipher internals




Hashing use case: Davies-Meyer compression function



Removing diffusion restriction not required in hashing




Simplifying the view: iterated permutation



Re-factoring of hashing modes, revisited

- Goal: hashing mode that is sound and simple
 - with good level of security against generic attacks
 - calling an **iterated permutation**
- Remaining problem: design of iterated permutation
 - round function: good approaches known
 - asymmetry: round constants
- Advantages with respect to block ciphers:
 - less barriers \Rightarrow more diffusion
 - no more need for efficient inverse
 - no more worries about key schedule

The result: the sponge construction




- f : a b -bit permutation with $b = r + c$
 - efficiency: processes r bits per call to f
 - security: provably resists generic attacks up to $2^{c/2}$
- Flexibility in trading rate r for capacity c or vice versa

What can we say about sponge security

- Generic security:
 - assuming f has been chosen randomly
 - covers security against generic attacks
 - construction as sound as theoretically possible
- Security for a specific choice of f
 - security proof is infeasible
 - Hermetic Sponge Strategy
 - design with attacks in mind
 - security based on absence of attacks despite public scrutiny


Regular hashing




■ Pre-sponge permutation-based hash functions

- Truncated permutation as compression function: Snefru [Merkle '90], FFT-Hash [Schnorr '90], ...MD6 [Rivest et al. 2007]
- Streaming-mode: SUBTERRANEAN, PANAMA, RADIOGATÚN, Grindahl [Knudsen, Rechberger, Thomsen, 2007], ...

Mask generating function




Use Sponge for MACing




- Pre-sponge (partially) permutation-based MAC function:
Pelican-MAC [Daemen, Rijmen 2005]

Use Sponge for (stream) encryption




- Similar to block cipher modes:
 - Long keystream per IV: like OFB
 - Short keystream per IV: like counter mode
- Independent permutation-based stream ciphers: Salsa and ChaCha [Bernstein 2005]

Single pass authenticated encryption




- But this is no longer the sponge ...

The duplex construction



- Generic security provably equivalent to that of sponge
- Applications: authenticated encryption, reseeding pseudorandom generator ...

SpongeWrap authenticated encryption



- Single-pass authenticated encryption
- Processes up to r bits per call to f
- **Functionally similar to (P)helix** [Lucks, Muller, Schneier, Whiting, 2004]

Features of iterated permutations

- Iterated permutations are
 - the natural choice for hashing modes
 - versatile cryptographic primitives
 - more flexible in modes than block ciphers
- In keyed modes efficiency can be boosted:
 - Security beyond $2^{c/2}$ in keyed modes
 - Dedicated variants for higher efficiency:
 - donkeySponge for MAC
 - monkeyDuplex for (authenticated) encryption


What textbooks and intro's should say from now on:-)

Symmetric cryptographic primitives:

- **Permutations**
- Block ciphers
- Stream ciphers
- Hash functions
 - Non-keyed
 - Keyed: MAC functions

And their modes-of-use

Questions?



<http://sponge.noekeon.org/>
<http://keccak.noekeon.org/>